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With the rapid development and popularity of information technology, criminals 
and mischievous computer users are given avenues to commit crimes and 
malicious activities. One of the commonly used tactics, called steganography, is 
to hide information under a cover media so that except participants, no one else 
knows the existence of such information. Many techniques have been proposed 
for hiding data in images, videos and audios, but there is not much research 
devoted to data hiding in the popular MS Office documents which have recently 
adopted Office Open XML (OOXML) format. 
 
In this research, we first focus on identifying several data hiding techniques for 
OOXML documents. Then, we design and develop a fast detection algorithm 
based on the unique internal structure of OOXML documents, which contains 
multiple XML files, by using multi-XML query technique. Experimental results 
show the proposed detection algorithm outperforms the traditional one in terms of 
detection speed and completeness, where performance is the key to success of 
detecting hidden data in OOXML documents due to the fact that millions of 
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The advent of information technology has brought us with more convenience and 
comfort. Millions of files and documents are transferred daily over the Internet. For 
example, we can easily pay bills, transfer money, and view paystubs and cheques all 
online. However, criminals and mischievous computer users are also given new avenues 
to commit crimes and malicious activities. One of the commonly used tactics is to hide 
information under a cover media, such as image, so that except participants, no one 
knows the existence of such information, also known as steganography. For example, a 
child pornography image can be hidden inside another image file or audio file or any 
other file format, which could look perfectly legitimate. Therefore, it is crucial to uncover 
these activities. 
Steganography (pronounced STEHG-uh-NAH-gruhf-ee, from Greeksteganos, or 
"covered," and graphie, or "writing") is the hiding of a secret message within an ordinary 
message and only the sender and receiver know of its existence and method of access 
[1]. New digital steganographic techniques in which messages are hidden into text, image 
and video files raise new challenges and require detection of steganographically encoded 
packages, is called steganalysis [2].  
Steganography also known as steg or stego, poses a major challenge to law enforcement 
officers. One of the most common illicit uses is for the possession and storage of child 
pornography images. However steganography can also be used to commit fraud, terrorist 
activities and other illegal acts [3]. Often these hidden files are also encrypted, adding 
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another layer of security to impede investigators [4]. Currently there are more than 300 
publicly available steganography encoding programs employing many different 
encryption algorithms which result in precluding any universal test for steganography [5]. 
Steganography made news headlines when the US Department of Justice charged 11 
individuals in two separate criminal complaints with conspiring to act as unlawful agents 
of the Russian Federation within the United States. The defendants allegedly used 
steganography to embed messages in more than 100 image files posted on public 
websites [6].  
Cryptography is another technique of secret writing and allows anyone to see the 
message, but nobody else can read it. This is because its letters have been rearranged, or 
replaced by different letters by using some scheme only known by the sender and 
receiver. Cryptography is being outlawed by many countries including US, European and 
Asian countries in important areas such as banks and financial institutions (notably 
brokers, credit card companies and securities firms) [7]. As a result, it is easy to attract 
the attention of law enforcement when any other encrypted network traffic or documents 
are seen online due to the fact that encrypted data looks like random data and can be 
easily distinguished [8]. Then, law enforcement can decrypt suspicious messages, 
especially because of the rapidly increasing computing power, such as quantum 
computing [9]. In this scenario, steganographic techniques become more attractive for 
mischievous users to transmit their messages and turn into serious problem for us, and 
needs to fight against. 
Steganography has attracted a lot of attention in the recent years, and most steganography 
work has been performed on images, video clips, text, music and sound. Until recently, 
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the switch from proprietary formats to XML format by applications vendors, such as 
Microsoft, Sun Microsystems and other developers for document files raised new 
concerns [10]. For example, a newly developed file format introduced by Microsoft 
named Office Open XML (OOXML) is a zipped, XML based file format for representing 
spreadsheets, charts, presentations and word processing documents [11]. It has been 
adopted in Microsoft Office 2007/2010. While it offers greater benefits over its 
predecessor, the proprietary binary file formats seen in previous versions of Microsoft 
Office, its unique internal file structure also opens the door to many new steganographic 
methods for data hiding in Microsoft Office documents based on OOXML. Furthermore, 
due to the popularity of Microsoft Office documents such as word or excel files, they 
have become a strong preference for mischievous users to use them as cover data for 
hiding information due to the fact that these document files could be easily ignored [12]. 
There is currently no available tools for law enforcement officers to find hidden 
information using various steganographic techniques, especially on these newly emerging 
cover media formats like OOXML. Active research is being carried out to further 
improve their adequacy. The work to standardize OpenXML has been carried out by 
Ecma International via its Technical Committee 45 (TC45), which includes 
representatives from Apple, Barclays Capital, BP, The British Library, Essilor, Intel, 
Microsoft, NextPage, Novell, Statoil, Toshiba, and the United States Library of Congress 
[13]. 
1.1 Research Motivation 
With the growth of Internet based technologies the XML is playing a vital role in data 
sharing, especially in the financial sector. Applications which use XML allow greater 
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flexibility in terms of data integration and cross platform applications. XML is also 
adapted and used by the software vendors and there are a number of XML based 
applications available on the market [10]. Now XML is also being used for document 
representation. For example, MS Office 2007 and Office Open from Sun Microsystems 
are few applications using XML file format known as OOXML and Open Document 
Format (ODF) respectively. 
In 2006, Microsoft brings in OOXML file format for its MS Office 2007 product. It 
brought a lot of advantages including compression of document, thus leading to less disk 
space utilization [13, 14]. Also, Microsoft Office documents becomes defacto standard 
such as word or excel files, and can be used on a wide range of hardware that runs 
Microsoft Office products including PC’s, mobile phones and PDAs. However that in 
turn provided many new ways to hide data in OOXML documents. The widespread of 
these documents and the likely chance to get unnoticed turn to be a good choice for 
mischievous users to use them as carrier files.  
Vendors are now also becoming aware of these limitations in their applications and 
propose features for its removal, such as provided by MS Office 2007 and known as 
Document Inspection. This feature inspects MS Office 2007 documents and allows 
removal of personal information and hidden data present in the document. Also, a 
warning message may pop up when a modified OOXML document doesn’t satisfy the 
OOXML structural requirements because of the hidden content. This makes data hiding 
more difficult and challenging, and recently, a lot of attentions have been paid to new 
steganographic methods of hiding data within OOXML documents [10, 16]. These could 
be used by some mischievous user to transmit information masked inside a document in 
5 
 
plain view for malicious purposes such as coordinating terrorist attacks or distributing 
inappropriate materials, and it becomes critical for law enforcement officers to monitor 
and detect hidden data in these documents in case that may be used by some terrorists for 
communication over the web. 
It is worth mentioning that around 7.5 million users downloaded beta version of MS 
Office 2010 whereas 40 million users generate documents using MS Office various 
versions with estimates exceeding 40 billion documents and billions more being created 
each year [13, 17]. This is a very challenging task to find hidden data in thousands of 
documents and the performance becomes key for hidden data detection algorithm to 
catering real time needs. Furthermore, unlike conventional steganography, which highly 
depends on cover media with limited applicable data hiding schemes, steganography in 
OOXML document allowing combination of data hiding techniques makes detection 
process more difficult and advance. There is a high demand for a fast and effective 
detection algorithm for hidden data in OOXML documents usually found in large 
numbers. 
Data Hiding and detection in OOXML documents is under-researched, especially 
considering how popular they are. In this thesis, we will investigate data hiding 
techniques for OOXML documents. We also study the fast and efficient detection 
algorithm to cater real time needs for such large extent of files. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The objective of this research is to identify steganographic techniques for MS Office 
2007 document which conforms to OOXML file format and as well as to design and 
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develop a fast and efficient algorithm to detect hidden data using presented techniques. 
Since these identified techniques are distinct from previous format that is binary format 
and new format is complex and pose many challenges. Newly introduced built in 
intelligent features for removing suspicious data in turn leads to application robustness 
and challenges data hiding attacks.  
The contribution of this thesis can be classified into two parts. First, we identify several 
successful data hiding techniques for OOXML files. These techniques are categorized into 
different ways: data hiding using OOXML relationship structure, data hiding using XML 
format feature, data hiding using XML format feature and OOXML relationship structure, 
data hiding using OOXML file embedded resource architecture and data hiding using 
OOXML flexibility of swapping parts. 
Second as per observation of data hiding techniques, we realize that the detection of 
hidden data requires scanning of multiple XML files as OOXML file comprises of 
multiple XML files zipped together. The conventional technique is to read these files one 
by one and thus inefficient in terms of time as thousands of documents transferred daily 
over the Internet. In order to overcome this issue, we designed a fast and efficient multi- 
XML files querying algorithm for OOXML documents by using a multi-XML query 
technique. The designed algorithm is enhanced and further customized for OOXML files 
structure. Our developed detection algorithm is using XQuery code and can be embedded 
with any steganalysis and detection tools available online. The XQuery provides efficient 
XML querying capabilities known so far.  
Finally, our developed detection XQuery code is open for code reuse and permits multiple 
interfaces which can be applied by other researchers. 
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1.3 Outline of the Thesis 
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 deals 
with literature review of other researcher works in this area and best known so far. Chapter 
3 gives an overview of OOXML file format related in terms with steganography plus also 
discuss approaches employed for data concealment in OOXML files with its experiment 
logic. Chapter 4 introduces a brief explanation of detection algorithm as well as 
hypothetical rules. These rules are subsequently justified with the experiments and 
findings depicted and also a comparison of developed tool technique with available 
conventional detection technique is presented. The performance analysis graph shows the 
time efficiency of proposed detection technique over conventional technique. Finally 






This chapter is devoted to illustrating how outside research in the field of digital 
steganography has affected this research. 
 
2.1 History of Steganography 
Throughout history steganography has been used to secretly communicate 
information between people. Some examples of use of steganography in past 
times are [18]: 
1. In Ancient Greece they used to select messengers and shave their head, they 
would then write a message on their head. Once the message had been written 
the hair was allowed to grow back. After the hair grew back the messenger 
was sent to deliver the message, the recipient would shave off the messengers 
hair to see the secret message. 
2. Another method used in Greece was where someone would peel wax off a 
tablet that was covered in wax, write a message underneath the wax then re-
apply the wax. The recipient of the message would simply remove the wax 
from the tablet to view the message. 
3. During World War II invisible ink was used to write information on pieces of 
paper so that the paper appeared to the average person as just being blank 
pieces of paper. Liquids such as urine, milk, vinegar and fruit juices were 
used, because when each one of these substances is heated they darken and 
become visible to the human eye. 
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4. In more recent history, several staganographic methods were used during 
World War II. Nazis developed microdots microfilm chips are the size of 
periods on a standard typewriter. These dots contain pages of information, 
drawing etc [3]. The Nazis also employed invisible ink and null ciphers. One 
of the most noted null cipher messages sent by a Nazi spy follows: 
 
“Apparently neutral’s protest is thoroughly discounted and ignored. Isman 
hard hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on by-products, 
ejecting suets and vegetable oils. 
 
Using the second letter from each word, the following message appears: 
“Pershing sails from NY June I” 
 
5. Finally during the Vietnam era, there were instances where captured members 
of the U.S. Armed Forces would use various hand gestures during photo ops, 
often only to have these gestures airbrushed out by the media. Other 
techniques employed were using the eyelids to blink word in Morse code 
(such as torture). 
The code was based on a five by five matrix with each letter being assigned a 
tap sequence based on this matrix. Spaces (pauses) between characters were 





 1 2 3 4 5 
1 A  .  . B  .  .. C,K  .  …. D  .  …. E  .  ….. 
2 F  ..  . G  ..  .. H  ..  … I  ..  …. J  ..  …. 
3 L  …  . M  …  .. N  …  … O  …  …. P  …  ….. 
4 Q  …   . R  ….  .. S  ….  … T  ….  …. U  ….  ….. 
5 V  …..  . W  …..  .. X  …..  … Y  …..  …. Z  …..  ….. 
 
Fig. 2.1 : 5x5 tap code used by Armed Forces in Vietnam 
 
2.2 Present Steganography 
With the boost in computer power, the internet and with the development of digital signal 
processing (DSP), steganography has gone digital which adds terms like “mp3”, “jpeg”, 
“mpeg”, and “document” files into our everyday vocabulary. Commonly these are the 
number of digital technologies that the community is concerned with, namely text files, 
still images, audio or video and documents.  
Today, steganography is researched both for legal and illegal reasons. Steganography 
would provide an ultimate guarantee of authentication that no other security tool may 
ensure. For example a digital watermark controls copyright of material transmits over the 
web such as images, music, movies and TV broadcasting. Such multimedia content is 
compressed first to save transmission time without affecting the quality of the content. 
These lossy compression techniques lend themselves perfectly for hiding data in such 
files. Another important use of steganography is to embed data about medical images, so 
that there are no problems with matching patients’ records and images. It is believed that 
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cyber crime also benefits from this digital revolution. Hence an immediate concern was 
shown on the possible use of steganography by criminals.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into details of steganographic methods, suffice 
it to say that there are two primary groups, multimedia steganography and document 
steganography. In multimedia contents, most of the work has been performed on images 
to embed data and mostly available tools support an image steganography by altering or 
replacing the Least Significant Bit (LSB). These tools take an advantage of compression 
types such as lossy and lossless to embed data inside an image.  A well known JPEG 
format uses lossy compression technique, whereas lossless compression technique used 
by GIF and BMP formats [18]. These compression techniques are explained in detail in 
data hiding section of this thesis. 
Another group is the use of steganography in documents works simply by adding white 
space and tabs to the ends of the lines of a document. This type of steganography is 
extremely effective, because the use of white space and tabs is not visible to the human 
eye at all, at least in most text/document editors. White space and tabs occur naturally in 
documents, so there isn’t really any possible way using this method of steganography 
would cause someone to be suspicious. Almost all computer users write and exchange 
documents written with application using proprietary document formats such as MS 
Office and gains lot of attention in the past in terms of steganography. The earlier 
versions of MS Office documents were having compound document file format and 
provided limited ways of data hiding. The data hiding can be done in binary format or 
using white spaces, tabs, line or word shifting and semantic methods [3]. The average 
size of trash space available in a compound document format is 6.53% of its size and can 
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be used for steganography [19]. Similar data hiding techniques also applies on XML files 
for text steganography. From the perspective of suspects, good data hiding techniques 
should meet the goals of security and capacity [19]. Unfortunately, these works are 
limited in the same way and information hiding using these techniques is limited. 
Recently, Microsoft introduced XML file format known as OOXML for its MS Office 
2007 documents. This format contains several XML files and other binary files which are 
zipped together to form an OOXML document. The flexibility of OOXML document can 
be used for steganographic purposes and MS Office 2007 has a built in feature to hide 
text in the document. MS Office 2007 also gives feature “Document Inspection” to 
remove hidden information from the documents generated by the application and by the 
user. To the best of our knowledge, few authors have provided a formal framework for 
steganography in OOXML documents and proved its possibility. This proves that a very 
little work is being done with this new format, i.e. OOXML format.  
In [15], the authors conceal data in OOXML document using unknown parts and 
unknown relationships. They also develop detection algorithm to detect existence of 
hidden data using identified technique. The detail explanation of their work is highlighted 
in data hiding section of this thesis. We believed that there are more ways to hide data in 
OOXML documents and presented few more data hiding techniques identified by us. In 
order to meet the goals of security and capacity, we can say that our identified data hiding 
techniques allow numerous options and looks genuine. 
Based on the fact that large number of documents is generated every day, we strongly 
believed that the key factor for detection algorithm is performance time. The 
conventional detection algorithm fails to cater real time need as thousands of documents 
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transferred daily over the net and thus requires a fast and efficient detection algorithm. 
This motivates us to design and develop a fast and efficient detection algorithm to detect 
hidden data in OOXML documents in much less time to cater real time need. We 
compared their given detection algorithm with our detection approach and presented the 
comparison in terms of performance in detection of hidden data section of this thesis. 
In [10], the authors discussed steganographic techniques for OOXML documents using 
encryption and comments feature of zip and XML files. Their work involves creation of 
encrypted documents containing simple texts and images. This encrypted OOXML 
document is stored as OLE compound file. They use popular 7-Zip utility software to 
read these files and the cryptanalysis reveals that OOXML document uses RSA and AES 
algorithms with a 128-bit key for encryption. They also presented technique of adding 
comments directly into zip archive using comment feature of zip file format and adding 
XML comments to the XML file. In both cases these comments are ignored by MS 
Office 2007 application and these comments are discarded when document is written 
back out. They further investigated that by using base64 encoding method they 
successfully embeds file as a comment in one of the XML files of OOXML document 
and MS Office 2007 ignores it silently. Their developed tool is called docx-steg.py can 
hides any file using this data hiding scheme. The data hiding scheme is given in data 
hiding section of this thesis. 
Their research work also focused on insights of XML based documents regarding their 
forensic implications. This gives further research directions such as these formats allows 
interpreting an information from XML tag’s to identify unauthorized tampering and 
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support scrutiny in court which enable law enforcement officers to use as digital evidence 
against suspects. 
We have chosen this research because it gives a chance to study several various aspects 
of steganography in OOXML documents which highlights deeper format restrictions for 
embedding hidden data and shows techniques which makes detection difficult, and also 
to identify and develop a fast and effective detection algorithm for OOXML documents 







Data Hiding Techniques in OOXML Documents 
3.1 Introduction 
A great deal of research has been accomplished in the area of hiding data in text, image, 
or audio files, but not so much on hiding data inside file structure of Office 2007 
documents, which adopts OOXML file format. 
As an open standard for data integration and interoperability, OOXML brings a lot of 
advantages. However, the open structure of OOXML, which is organized in a zip archive 
or package, also faces various security threats. One of the most serious security threats is 
hidden data issue, where information is concealed within an OOXML file. 
Data hiding in Office Open XML presents a variety of challenges that arise due to the 
importance of conformance of the relationships within the package. In order for an 
OOXML Word document to be properly displayed in an OOXML file editor, for 
example, Microsoft Office Word, the relationships among the various files in the package 
have been satisfied. For example the image is stored as a separate file in a package and 
only its metadata information containing “Id” is stored in the main document file. When 
the main document is opened, its corresponding “Id” has been searched in its relationship 
file which contains the type and target (location) of the image. Then, the document editor 
fetches the image by using the relationship information and places it in the main 
document, making this whole process transparent from the user. Furthermore an OOXML 
file editor, for example MS Office 2007, has a document inspector feature. It not only 
removes some hidden data or private or personal information (often known as metadata) 
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from OOXML files, but also gives a warning if certain relationship of the files is broken. 
From the perspective of suspects, good data hiding techniques should meet the goals of 
security and capacity, in particularly unsuspicious for the existence of secret data hidden 
inside a cover media [19]. Obviously, successful information concealment in an OOXML 
document or MS Office 2007 document must satisfy the following conditions:  
 The hidden data must not satisfy all the relationships in the package. Otherwise, this 
hidden information might be immediately visible when the document is open in an 
OOXML editor. 
 The hidden data must be specifically inserted to avoid detection by document 
inspectors. Otherwise, a warning might be displayed when the document is open in an 
OOXML editor. 
 Hidden data would not be overwritten or the possibility of data being overwritten is 
low and the technique can store reasonable amount of hidden data. 
Despite these challenges the potential OOXML structure provides for new ways of data 
hiding exploitation techniques in MS Office 2007. An overview of OOXML format 
related in terms of steganography is presented here for better understanding.  
3.2 OOXML File Format and MS Office 2007 
Microsoft introduced XML into Office 2007 with full fidelity known as Office Open 
XML (OOXML) file format. OOXML document structure is also based on Open 
Packaging Conventions (OPC). The OOXML format enables that generated document 
will be fully compatible with other cross platform business applications. Several 
countries including US and few European countries have formally announced either 
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adoption, or the evaluation of adoption of OOXML. It means that OOXML standard is 
permitted to be used where national regulations do not allow proprietary formats.  
OOXML file format consists of a compressed ZIP file, called package. ZIP was chosen as 
the package format for the Office XML formats because it is a well understood industry 
standard. All of the contents within the document are hold by a package. In addition to 
Office markup, the package can also include embedded files such as images, videos, or 
other documents. The ZIP compression decreases the size of the document up to 75% and 
is more robust to error handling [19], which allows in turn an ease of managing and 
repairing of individual segmented files within a package. For example, you can open MS 
Word 2007 document that uses OOXML format, and locates the XML part that 
represents the body of the Word document. By altering this part using any technology 
capable of editing XML and returning the XML part to the container package, creates an 
updated Office document. This new file format is classified into three main parts. 
3.2.1 Container – Package 
OOXML documents are stored in OPC package form, which is a ZIP file, containing 
XML and other data parts [11, 14]. The relationships specification between the parts is 
also stored inside the container. Relationship information is used by an application to 
locate individual parts within a package. The package can have different internal 




















Fig. 3.1: Internal directory structure of an OOXML document, shows 
               package, parts and relationships files a package may contain. 
 
A basic package contains an XML file called [Content_Types].xml at the root, along with 
three directories: “_rels”, “docProps” and document type specific directory. For example, 
in MS Word 2007 document the “word” directory has been created and contains the 
“document.xml” file which is the starting path of the document. These folders have all 
the files located in the package and zipped together to form a single instance of the 
document. Every part in a package has a unique URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) part 
name along with specified content type. A part’s content type explicitly defines the type 
of data stored and reduces ambiguity and duplication issues inherent with file extensions. 
Package can also include relationships that define association between the package, parts 




3.2.2 Package Parts 
Parts inside a package are of any type including text, image etc [11, 14]. The extension 
“.rels” is reserved for storing relationship information of package parts and stored in 
“/rels” subfolders. Three names are reserved by package for organizing its files i.e. 
“_rels” subfolder carrying relationship information with “.rels” file extension and file 















Fig. 3.2: A logical structured organization of package parts of an OOXML document. The 
“common package parts” exists in all OOXML document, whereas “specific format parts” 
depends on type of application used. 
 
Where, “[Content_Types].xml” file provides MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions) type information for parts used in the OOXML document. It also defines 
mapping based on the file extensions, along with overrides for specific parts other than 




contents of any part to process accurately; “docProps/app.xml” file contains application 
centric properties such as application type “Microsoft Office Word” etc; 
“docProps/core.xml” file contains OOXML document core properties such as machine 
name, creation and modification dates etc; whereas “word/document.xml” is the main 
part of any word document. 
3.2.3 Relationships 
Relationship items classify that how the document parts are placed together to form a 
document as shown in Fig. 3.3. This is achieved by verifying connection between source 
part and target part. Two types of relationships are permitted in OOXML documents, 
internal and external [11, 14]. All relationships, including the relations associated with 
the root package, are represented as XML files. These XML files contain relationships 
information and are stored inside a package, for example, default location for 
relationships is “/_rels/.rels”. Relationships are composed of four elements: an identifier 
(Id), an optional source (package or part), relationship type (URI style expression) and a 
target (URI to another part). Two types of relationship files usually exist in a package. 
These are: 
 /_rels/.rels: Root level “_rels” folder contains relationship file which carries 
information of parts for the package. For example “_rels/.rels” file defines the 
starting part of the document i.e. “word/document.xml”.  
 [partname].rels: Each part may have its own relationships. The part specific 
relationship can be looked in “word/_rels” subfolder, a sibling of the file with 
original file name appended to it with “.rels” extension. For example 
“word/_rels/document.xml.rels”. Figure 3.3, Showing how package parts are tied 
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with each other using relationship information associated with each part. Highlighted 













Fig. 3.3: Logical representation of OOXML document relationships. 
 
A typical package relationships file “.rels” contains XML code and for simplicity we only 






In above code, “Relationship Id” attribute value “rId1” is default for main document part 
which is the starting part of a document. Once the document is being launched the 
 
       <Relationships 
xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> 
     <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/of




OOXML editor looks for an OOXML parser to be used depending on document type. In 
this case the type specifies that MS Word ML is being used for MS Word document. 
Another attribute “Target” specifies path or location of beginning part i.e. document.xml.  
3.3 Data Hiding in OOXML - MS Word 2007 documents 
Next, we will briefly introduce several successful data hiding techniques for OOXML 
files. These techniques can be classified into different categories including data hiding 
using OOXML relationship structure, data hiding using XML format features, data hiding 
using XML format features and OOXML relationship structure, data hiding using 
OOXML flexibility for embedded resource architecture and data hiding using OOXML 
flexibility of swapping parts. We use MS Word 2007 document, as an example, to 
illustrate our concepts, but the methodology can be easily extended to any documents in 
MS Office 2007 or OOXML file format. 
3.3.1 Data Hiding using OOXML Relationship Structure 
As mentioned earlier the MS Office 2007 document is comprises of several xml and other 
files. These files are known as parts and compressed together using ZIP format. These 
parts are also organized using the relationship information found in relationship files 
inside an OOXML document. To satisfy relationships within a document, all parts have 
to be a target of valid relationship entry. Parts which are not the target of a valid 
relationship entry, we considered that part as an unknown part [15]. These parts are not to 
be ignored when reading the document by MS Office 2007 application and raised an error 
that the document is corrupt as shown in Fig. 3.4. MS Office 2007 also facilitate user by 
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In similar way the relationship entry which is not defined in ECMA-376 standard is also 
considered as unknown relationships. These relationship entries are accepted in OOXML 
document and raise no errors. Document containing unknown relationship information 
are opened normally and the relationship entry is also being found inside a relationship 
file. This is also remains present if user saves a document with new name.  
Next we provide specific example of data hiding by using information of relationship 
structure of OOXML document. The OOXML document works as a carrier for the 
hidden data. In this case MS Word 2007 document is used in this data hiding process. 
 The first step of data hiding initiates with unzipping the OOXML document using 
any zip utility software. This shows that OOXML document contains several 
XML files and other objects. 
 In Second step, insert files wish to hide in the unzipped OOXML document 
archive. These files can be added to any folder or sub folder of the document.  
 Third, we need to define types of added files into OOXML documents content 
type’s file. There is no need to define file types multiple times if it’s already exist 
in the content type file. 
 The fourth step is defining relationships entry for inserted files into package 
relationship file i.e. “_rels/.rels” The attributes of relationship entry is “Id”, 
“Type” and “Target”. The relationship attribute “Id” must be unique as it connects 
the document and the target files, whereas “Type” attribute is some character 
which is not defined in OOXML standard such as “a”, “b” etc. The “Target” 
attribute contains the complete path or location from the document’s root folder 
for the inserted files. 
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 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” which later is 
renamed to “.docx”. 
For example, we created a document containing some text and image and saved it as 
“Uparts&Rels”. Next by using WinZip utility we unzipped this document and inserted 
“sysinternals.zip”, “mask.jpeg” and “BYE.mp3” as our hidden files in the root folder of 
the document i.e. “Uparts&Rels”. After inserting these files we updated the 
“[Content_Types].xml” file for inserting files types. The content type file can be found 
inside root folder named “[Content_Types].xml”. Before opening a document, the 
OOXML parser validates that the files present in the package are defined in [Content_ 
Types].xml file. The code for defining hidden file types into “[Content_Type].xml” file is 








Fig. 3.6 – Modified [Content_Types].xml File 
At last the package level relationship file “_rels/.rels” is used for creating relationships of 
hidden files within a package. The relationship entry attributes such as Id, Type, and 




   <Override PartName="/word/footnotes.xml" ContentType="……." />  
 
   <Default Extension="jpeg" ContentType="image/jpeg" />  
   <Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-
package.relationships+xml" />  
    
     <Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml" />  
   <Default Extension="zip" ContentType="application/zip" />  
   <Default Extension="mp3" ContentType="application/mp3" />  
    
     <Default Extension="jpg" ContentType="application/jpg" />  
 
   <Override PartName="/word/document.xml" ContentType="……." />  
………….. 
  </Types> 
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Fig. 3.7 – Modified relationship file (.rels) 
As seen above, the relationship Id of “BYE.mp3” is “rd102” and Type is 
http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/Relationships/c. Note as 
mentioned above when setting a type we use values that does not exist in the OOXML 
specifications such as “a, b, c, etc”.  After these modifications the OOXML document is 
opened normally without a warning. Also if user amends the document and updates it, the 
hidden data remains in the document. The MS Office application considers unknown 
parts and unknown relationships as valid parts and relationships of a package.  
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes" ?>  
      <Relationships 
xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> 
    <Relationship Id="rId3" Type="…" Target="docProps/app.xml" />  
    <Relationship Id="rId2" Type="…" Target="docProps/core.xml" />  
    <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="…" Target="word/document.xml" />  
 
    <Relationship Id="rId100" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/Relationships/a
" Target="word/media/sysinternals.zip" />  
    <Relationship Id="rId101" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/Relationships/b
" Target="mask.jpg" />  
    <Relationship Id="rId102" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/Relationships/c" 
Target="word/BYE.mp3" />  
 
  </Relationships> 
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As explained earlier that hidden data must not satisfy all the relationships in the package, 
otherwise it is visible in document. Also if only an inserted file type is defined in Content 
Type file and its relationship is not created in relationship file, the document opens 
normally. Office application does not give any warning and inserted file still exists inside 
the package. In this case if user updates or makes some changes in the word document, 
then inserted file is being eliminated by the application. So for keeping the existence of 
inserted file, its relationship needs to be created in relationship file. 
This data hiding method is the natural result of an explicit relationship in OOXML. The 
key point of this hiding process is to assign a fresh Id to new target which results that the 
target being overlooked by the MS Office application. The new Id is not referenced in the 
relationship part and the main source part is not aware of the new content and the hidden 
data is not shown on screen and neither can be eliminated by MS Office application 
because these hidden data have an Id and satisfies relationship structure of OOXML 
document. At this point, if relationships between main MS Office document file and 
hidden data are defined, the hidden data becomes more difficult to discover. 
This data concealment approach also sidesteps the document inspection feature “Inspect 
document” available in MS Office 2007 applications. 
3.3.2 Data Hiding using XML Format Feature 
XML comment feature is used to leave a note or to temporarily edit out a portion of XML 
code. Although XML is supposed to be self-describing data, you may still come across 
some instances where an XML comment might be necessary. XML comments follow the 
exact same syntax as HTML comments. XML features are fully supported by OOXML 
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documents as contain several XML files. The text in OOXML documents are organized 
into XML sections and are repetitive. OOXML documents do not generate any comments 
in XML files of a document whereas XML comments feature can easily be used for data 
hiding purpose by some mischievous user.  
It is highlighted that data can be hidden inside an OOXML document using comments 
feature. This involves technique of adding comments directly to zip archive using 
comment feature of zip file format and adding XML comments to the XML file [10]. In 
both cases, these comments are ignored by MS Office 2007 application and these 
comments are discarded when document is written back out.  
Further investigation proves that base64 encoding method allows successful embedding 
of file as a comment in one of the XML files of OOXML document and MS Office 2007 
ignores it silently and document opens normally. Base64 provided a very simple yet 
effective way of taking information with a wide range of characters (ASCII has 127 
possible characters) and converting this into a method that can be stored with a smaller 
range of characters (base64 output uses 64 characters, as the name implies). 
This technique hides a file by taking advantage of XML format feature such as 
comments. Anything in comments is effectively invisible to the XML parser but for use 
of successful data hiding in OOXML documents, first the data is encoded to base64 
format. This data concealment process requires following steps. 
 First, an OOXML document is being unzipped using WinZip utility. 
 Second, the data or file to be hidden is encoded to base64 format. 
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 Third, the data or file is added in any of the XML file present inside an OOXML 
document. 
 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” which later is 
renamed to “.docx”. 
For Example, we created one document contains some text and an image. Then unzip it 
using any zip utility and a secret message is added using comments feature in one of the 
XML file. The secret message is as follows: 
<!-- This is a secret message--> 
 
The secret message is encoded using base64 encoding scheme and the above message 
after encoding is as follows: 
PCEtLSBUaGlzIGlzIGEgc2VjcmV0IG1lc3NhZ2UtLT4= 
After the base64 encoding, we add this data to any of the XML file.  According to XML 
standard the comments cannot appear at the very top of your document in XML, only the 
XML declaration can come first such as: 
<?xml version="1.0"?> 
Document inspection feature of MS Office 2007 allow removing of comments from the 
document. Whereas, by using this approach the document inspection feature fails to 
identify and remove comments embedded using base64 encoding scheme. This technique 
also enables to hid some file in an OOXML document using base64 encoding scheme. 
The quality of this data hiding technique is relatively low as XML files carries base64 
encoded data and could be easily notice by others if unzips the document. 
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3.3.3 Data Hiding using XML Format Feature and OOXML 
Relationship Structure 
Ignorable attribute is also an important feature of MS Office 2007 applications [14]. For 
any associated XML element, compatibility rules are very important. Compatibility rules 
are associated with an element by means of compatibility rule attributes. These controls 
how MS Office 2007 parser shall react to elements or attributes from unknown 
namespaces. The principal compatibility rule attribute is the Ignorable attribute. By 
default MS Office 2007 treat the presence of any unknown element or attribute as an 
error condition [10, 14]. However, unknown elements or attributes identified in an 
Ignorable attribute shall be ignored without error. 
The ignorable attribute specifies which XML namespace prefixes encountered in a 
markup file may be ignored by an OOXML processor. Elements or attributes, where the 
prefix portion of the element name are identified as “ve:Ignorable”, will not raise an 
error when processed by an OOXML processor. The “ve” XML namespace is the 
recommended prefix convention to use when mapping the XAML (Extensible 
Application Markup Language) compatibility_namespace 
“http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006”. The “ve:Ignorable” 
attribute supports markup compatibility both for custom namespace mapping and for 
XML versioning. 
ECMA-376 specification describes the Ignorable attribute: “A whitespace-delimited list 
of namespace prefixes identifying a set of namespaces whose elements and attributes 
should be silently ignored by markup consumers that do not understand the namespace of 
the element or attribute in question”. 
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This data concealment technique supports any kind of data such as image, audio or video 
file to be hidden by taking advantage of XML format feature and OOXML relationship 
structure.  This technique coerces XAML parser to treat that element and attributes as it 
does not exist and shall not generate an error. By default, ignore element is entirely 
ignored including its attributes and contents. This data concealment process requires 
following steps. 
 First, an OOXML document is being unzipped using WinZip utility. 
 Second, add an image which needs to be hidden using this technique in sub folder 
named “word/media”. This sub folder usually contains all images used inside a 
document. 
 Third, for the hidden image to be looking legitimate, we created metadata for 
hidden image inside main document file “document.xml”.  
 Fourth, use Ignorable attribute to define this in declaration section of main 
document file i.e. “document.xml” and place this tag before and after of created 
metadata for hiding image. 
 Fifth, the part relationship file “document.xml.rels” is amended with creating 
relationship attributes such as “Id”, Type” and “Target”. The “Id” must be unique 
and other attributes “Type” and “Target” contains information of image type and 
location. 
 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” which later is 
renamed to “.docx”. 
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For example, we created and saved a document containing image and some text data 
named as “Ignore.docx”. After unzipping this document we add image which needs to be 










Fig. 3.8 – Added Image shown with other files in OOXML document 
 
After inserting an image in “word/media” subfolder, the main document file is 
updated with the metadata code for an inserted image. For simplicity we copy the 
metadata code of first image inserted using MS Office application and paste as a 
separate block for hidden image in “document.xml” file. Next to hide this image, the 
Ignorable attribute is defined inside a main document declaration section as shown in 
Fig. 3.9. The code highlighted in red is used to define ignorable namespace which 
markup consumer does not understand. After defining the ignorable attribute 
namespace, the ignorable tag is placed before and after the metadata of second image 
need to be hides. The hidden image is “Garden.jpeg” and its metadata tags in 





























Fig. 3.10 – End section of main document file “document.xml” 










xmlns:p1="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/MyExtension/p1" ve:Ignorable="p1" >  
<w:sectPr w:rsidR="00401AD8" w:rsidRPr="0091776E" w:rsidSect="00DC51FF">  
<w:pgSz w:w="12240" w:h="15840" />  
<w:pgMar w:top="1440" w:right="1440" w:bottom="1440" w:left="1440" w:header="720" 
w:footer="720" w:gutter="0" />  
<w:cols w:space="720" />  



















































Fig. 3.11 – Metadata of first image, inserted using MS Word 2007 
<w:body>  





<w:p w:rsidR="0091776E" w:rsidRDefault="00401AD8">  
<w:r>  
<w:drawing>  
<wp:inline distT="0" distB="0" distL="0" distR="0">  
<wp:extent cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
<wp:effectExtent l="19050" t="0" r="0" b="0" />  
























<a:off x="0" y="0" /> 




























































Fig. 3.12 – Sample metadata of hidden image 
<p1:IgnoreMe>  
<w:p w:rsidR="00401AD8" w:rsidRPr="0091776E" 
w:rsidRDefault="0091776E" w:rsidP="0091776E">  
<w:pPr>  
<w:tabs>  




<w:lastRenderedPageBreak />  
<w:drawing>  
<wp:inline distT="0" distB="0" distL="0" distR="0">  
<wp:extent cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
<wp:effectExtent l="19050" t="0" r="0" b="0" />  













<pic:cNvPr id="0" name="Garden.jpg" />  
<pic:cNvPicPr />  
</pic:nvPicPr>  
<pic:blipFill>  
<a:blip r:embed="rId5" cstate="print" />  
<a:stretch>  





<a:off x="0" y="0" />  
<a:ext cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
</a:xfrm>  
<a:prstGeom prst="rect">  













Finally, the part relationship file “document.xml.rels” is updated with a valid relationship 
entry of an inserted image along with its type and target information. In this case the 
highlighted relationship entry having Id “rId5” is added in relationship file with type 
“http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image” and 
















Fig. 3.13 – Relationship file showing entry for hidden image 
At this point the image is successfully hidden using Ignorable attribute. To keep this 
hidden image intact with the document its relationship must be created. Only using XML 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes" ?>  
- <Relationships 
xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> 
  <Relationship Id="rId3" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/web
Settings" Target="webSettings.xml" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId7" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/the
me" Target="theme/theme1.xml" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId2" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/setti
ngs" Target="settings.xml" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/styl
es" Target="styles.xml" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId6" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/font
Table" Target="fontTable.xml" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId5" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/ima
ge" Target="media/image2.jpeg" />  
  <Relationship Id="rId4" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/ima
ge" Target="media/image1.jpeg" />  
  </Relationships> 
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feature such as ignorable attribute does not guarantee of keeping hidden image with the 
document and requires both the techniques for data hiding. The content type file is not 
required to amend with image type if same type of image is inserted. If inserted image 
type is different than first image, the content type file also needs to be updated with 
hidden image type. The sample code for updating content type is as follows: The 
[Content_Types].xml file is located at root level in the package. 
 
                                                                                                
 
 
Data hides using this technique is really hard to trace as it conform all the association to 
the main document file. The relationship entry is also exist in relationship file, and with 
the insertion of metadata code of hidden image in “document.xml” file do not raise any 
doubt of illegitimate data hidden inside an OOXML document. 
 
3.3.4 Data Hiding Using OOXML Flexibility For Embedded Resource 
Architecture 
The Custom XML feature is one of the most powerful features of OOXML documents 
for business scenario and document centric solutions [14]. It supports integration of 
documents with business process and data to get true interoperability of documents. This 
is a really powerful concept and entails to store custom xml file in the package, binding 
content controls to elements using implicit relationship, and control the display of this 
data used in the document as custom XML part. This allows you to embed business 
semantics in such a way that it is discoverable, and implementers not interested in using 
that feature can skip over it easily, without needing to know what application stored it 
<Default Extension="jpeg"ContentType="image/jpeg" /> 
 




there. You can even easily extract your data using one simple generic XSLT (Extensible 
Stylesheet Language Transformations). 
A package is permitted to contain multiple custom XML data storage parts. The ability to 
put custom XML file in the package means that; now have a place to store any data 
solution required and travels with the document. This standard curtails to have implicit or 
explicit relationship with other parts in the package. The Custom XML feature is fully 
implemented for MS Word 2007. MS Excel and MS Powerpoint 2007 do not handle 
custom XML the same way. The further announcements from Microsoft for translators 
from binary to OOXML format might be another good advantage. 
The ability to embed and interweave business data into transportable and humanly 
readable documents is extremely useful.  Take for instance the efforts to standardize the 
embedding of patient medical data into PDF documents, (aka PDF/H). Records For 
Living has been able to take advantage of Open XML's capabilities with regards to its 
support of custom schemas to integrate two industry standards: Ecma's Open XML and 
the ASTM's Continuity of Care Record (CCR).  The combination is powerful: patients 
can use personal health record (PHR) software to exchange live reports with their doctors 
in a way that is both human and machine readable [20]. 
This feature also empowers data concealment using OOXML flexibility for embedded 
resources inside MS Office 2007 document. The Custom XML data is also been 
generated by OOXML document in some cases. The object embedding feature of 
OOXML document requires generation of Custom XML data for handling information of 
that object. This is also being in the case if integrating OOXML document data with real 
world data. First we take a brief overview of CustomXML data generated by an OOXML 
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document application and then present our data hiding method using CustomXML data 
scheme. The default layout of the unzip OOXML document contains Custom XML data 









Fig. 3.14 – Document Structure with Custom XML data and its part relationship code 
 
By default an OOXML document creates customXML folder at root to store custom 
XML data files. This folder contains two XML files, “item1.xml” and “itemProps1.xml”. 
The part relationship file of customXML data is being generated at “customXml” folder 
under “customXml/_rels” subfolder as “item1.xml.rels”, and contains relationship entry 
for “itemProps1.xml” file. Relationship entry for the custom XML files is shown as Fig. 
3.14 and the part relationship file of main document “document.xml.rels” is also updated 
with an entry of second custom XML file i.e. “item1.xml” with Id “rId1” as shown in Fig. 
3.15. 
 
  <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" 
standalone="yes" ?>  
 




    <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/o
fficeDocument/2006/relationships/customX
mlProps" Target="itemProps1.xml" />  
 
  </Relationships> 

















Fig. 3.15. Part relationship file code “document.xml.rels” 
Next the steps of data hiding using CustomXml feature is as follows: 
 First, create and save an OOXML document named “CustomXML.docx” contains 
text and image. 
 Second, creates a folder at root named “customXml” and insert some text file 
need to hides in OOXML document. The text file is in XML format to looks 
legitimate CustomXML data. 





 <Relationship Id="rId8" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/theme" Target="theme/theme1.xml" />  
 <Relationship Id="rId3" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/settings" Target="settings.xml" />  
 <Relationship Id="rId7" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/fontTable" Target="fontTable.xml" />  
 <Relationship Id="rId2" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/styles" Target="styles.xml" />  
 <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/customXml" Target="../customXml/item1.xml" />  
 
 <Relationship Id="rId6" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/endnotes" Target="endnotes.xml" />  
 
 <Relationship Id="rId5" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship
s/footnotes" Target="footnotes.xml" />  
 
 <Relationship Id="rId4" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationship





 Third, creates a subfolder named “customXml/_rels” and also creates one 
relationship file for hidden text file. 
 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” and later 
rename it to “.docx”. 
For example, we use this technique to hide some text data inside MS Office document. 
We created “customXml” folder at root of the package and insert one text file named 









Fig. 3.17 – Sample code of “hiddendata.xml” file 
Next we satisfy its relationship constraint by creating its relationship file inside a 
“customXml/ _rels” subfolder and named this “hiddendata.xml.rels” shown as Fig. 3.18. 
We observe that if we do not skip its entry in part relationship file of main document, the 
Inspect Document feature can easily identify the custom XML data and allows user to 
discard the custom XML data.  






<w:p w:rsidR="00DC51FF" w:rsidRDefault="00C2303E"> 
<w:r> 













Fig. 3.18 – Sample code of customXml part relationship file 
This technique allows insertion of any text file in xml format contains hidden data and 
with its internal sub-relationship. This also looks legitimate as carries Custom XML data 
in real business environment. The key point to identify whether this is hidden data or not 
is to see, that whether CustomXml type entry is present in part relationship file of main 
document.  The hidden data under customXml folder is not linked with the main 
document file “document.xml”. 
The MS Office document gives feature that allows you to remove custom XML data 
associated with the document. This feature is named as Inspect document which removes 
custom XML data, hidden data and other personal information form MS Office 
document. The snapshot of this feature is as follows: 
The inspect document feature functionality is to search customXml type in part 
relationship file of main document (“document.xml.rels”). Once found, it deleted the 
associated data using target information and also discard customXml folder with its 
contents. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes" ?> 
<Relationships 
xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> 
 <Relationship Id="rId100" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/custom















Fig. 3.19 – Inspect document feature of MS Office 2007 
The document inspection feature of MS Office 2007 is unable to detect custom XML data 
in this scenario as it sidesteps the document inspection feature of MS Office 2007 
application. 
3.3.5 Data Hiding Using OOXML Flexibility of Swapping Parts 
Images are the most popular cover objects used for steganography. In the domain of 
digital images many different image file formats exist, most of them for specific 
applications. The MS Office 2007 uses “png”, “jpeg”, “gif” and “emf” formats for storing 
images inside a document [13]. 
An image is a collection of numbers that constitute different light intensities in different 




referred to as pixels. Most images on the Internet consists of a rectangular map of the 
image’s pixels (represented as bits) where each pixel is located with its color. These 
pixels are displayed horizontally row by row. Digital color images are typically stored in 
24-bit files and use the RGB color model, also known as true color. All color variations 
for the pixels of a 24-bit image are derived from three primary colors: red, green and 
blue, and each primary color is represented by 8 bits. Thus in one given pixel, there can 
be 256 different quantities of red, green and blue, adding up to more than 16-million 
combinations, resulting in more than 16-million colors [21]. 
When working with larger images of greater bit depth, the images tend to become too 
large to transmit over a standard Internet connection. In order to display an image in a 
reasonable amount of time, techniques must be incorporated to reduce the image’s file 
size. These techniques make use of mathematical formulas to analyze and condense 
image data, resulting in smaller file sizes. This process is called compression [22].  
In images there are two types of compression: lossy and lossless. Both methods save 
storage space, but the implemented procedures are different. Lossy compression creates 
smaller files by discarding excess image data from the original image. It removes details 
that are too small for the human eye to differentiate, resulting in close approximations of 
the original image, although not an exact duplicate. An example of an image format that 
uses this compression technique is JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group). Lossless 
compression, on the other hand, never removes any information from the original image, 
but instead represents data in mathematical formulas. The original image’s integrity is 
maintained and the decompressed image output is bit-by-bit identical to the original 
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image input. The most popular image formats that use lossless compression is GIF 
(Graphical Interchange Format) and 8-bit BMP (a Microsoft Windows bitmap file). 
The compression technique used by MS Office 2007 for image compression requires an 
image is first 2D transformed and converted into emu (English Measurement Unit) rather 
than device pixels for implementation as recommended [11, 14].  
The flexibility of data hiding using OOXML architecture of swapping parts allows 
swapping of images between two OOXML documents. This data hiding scheme supports 
two data hiding scenarios as follows. 
Scenario 1 
 First, the OOMXL document is unzipped using WinZip utility.  
 Second, swap an image with the original image found in “word/media” subfolder. 
Also ensure that the swapped image follows the same name of an original image. 
The inserted image is being transformed according to OOXML image 
transformation standard before swapping. 
 Third, the content type file is needed to be updated if swapped image is of another 
format.  
 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” and later 
rename it to “.docx”. 
Scenario 2 
 First, the OOMXL document is unzipped using WinZip utility.  
 Second, an original image found inside “word/media” subfolder used to embed 
files using any image stego software.  
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 Finally, all the files are zipped together with an extension of “.zip” and later 
rename it to “.docx”. 
For example, the swapped image has to be transformed or compressed first before 
swapping otherwise OOXML document raise an error. The best way is to add desired 
image into MS Office 2007 document and save the document. This way an image is 
automatically transformed by the application. Later unzip this document and swap image 







Fig. 3.20 – Swapping of image between 2 OOXML documents 
This facilitates mischievous user to swap images of two documents, and by using any 
available image steganography tool can embeds files into an existing image. The replaced 
image should be of same type of swapped image otherwise the content type is updated 
with newly inserted image type. The OOXML document flexibility for embedding 
resources proves that mischievous user can easily embeds data inside an image present in 




The image steganography tools used least significant bit (LSB) approach for bitmap 
format, palette based approach for gif format and Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) or 
Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) for JPEG format images. Swapping of images cannot 
be detected by using any feature of MS Office 2007 application and hence seems that 
manual scrutiny of the images are required to ensure that it does not carries any hidden 
data. 
This technique also supports steganography and MS Office 2007 is unable to detect the 





Hidden Data Detection in OOXML Documents 
4.1 Introduction 
As XML becomes the standard format for data exchange between inter-enterprise 
applications on the internet and enables the transmission of highly structured data using 
standard HTTP protocol instead of proprietary solutions, which sometimes do not allow 
for compatibility [23, 24]. The variety of data types is very large and also the need of bi-
directional data exchange can largely benefit from the advantages offered by this new 
technology. That’s changing as Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and other developers 
migrate to new XML-based formats for document files [10]. 
XML is a <tag> based language incorporating a number of features directed to the 
hierarchical classification of the data. It is extensible, since the user can define its own 
labels, and it is object-oriented, when most current systems are procedural-oriented. 
Moreover, it allows the inclusion of metadata, i.e., the description of the structure and 
format of the data goes along with the data itself, and it includes mechanisms for 
validating the structure of the data records This achieves all what the industry data format 
standards aimed for, whilst providing wide compatibility and allowing the use of the 
information outside the proprietary database environment. 
To facilitate data exchange, industry groups define document type definition (DTDs) that 
specify the format of the XML data to be exchanged between their applications [25]. As 
seen in the previous sections, the MS Office document comprises of several XML files 
and parts. These files are carrying collective information to intact parts used inside a 
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main document. The relationship files contain the information of organization of a 
package which is actually an OOXML document. The main package level relationship 
file contains information for OOXML editor defining which application is being used to 
process the document, like MS Word 2007 in our case, whereas the part relationship 
information file contains information of associated parts and layout of a document. 
Therefore, the identification of hidden parts inside a package requires querying the 
contents of multiple xml files. Basically the query identifies concealed data in multiple 
XML files which are actually not generated by MS Office application.  
Also discussed earlier the significance of the fulfilling relationship standard within the 
package is essential. A complete content to be correctly presented in an OOXML file 
editor, the relationships between the various parts in the package needs to be satisfied. 
For example, an image is saved as a separate part in the package and only its relationship 
Id and metadata information is stored in the main document. When the main document is 
launched, the parts associated with the main document and their corresponding 
relationship Id’s have been searched in the parts relationship file, which contains the 
information such as type and target (location) of the parts. The OOXML parser brings the 
part (image) by using the relationship information and placed it in the main document and 
makes this whole process transparent from the user.  
Fig. 4.1 shows the package layout of the MS Office document and Fig. 4.2 shows the 
logical order that how associated parts are referenced using relationship information with 
































Fig. 4.2 – Preview of associated parts using relationship information with main document file.  
4.2 Document Inspection – detection feature of MS Office 2007 
Several types of hidden data and personal information can be saved in an MS Office 2007 
document [26, 27]. This information might not be immediately visible when viewing the 
document in MS Office 2007 application, but it might be possible for other people to 





2007 application adds to a file. This enables you to collaborate on writing and editing a 
document with other people. It can also include information that you deliberately 
designate as hidden. Office documents can contain the following types of hidden data and 
personal information such as: 
 Comments, revision marks from tracked changes, versions, and ink notations 
 Document properties and personal information 
 Headers, footers, and watermarks 
 Hidden text 
 Hidden rows, columns, and worksheets 
 Invisible content 
 Off-slide content 
 Presentation notes 
 Document server properties 
 Custom XML data 
The Document Inspector includes several different inspectors specific to individual 
Office programs. Each of these specific programs is to find and remove hidden data and 
personal information from the documents. The main function of detection algorithm is to 
find possible carrier files. Ideally, it would also provide some clues as to the 
steganography algorithm used to hide information in the suspect files. This enables an 
analyst to attempt recovery of the hidden information.  
The document inspector cannot detect data, hides by using techniques listed in the data 
hiding section of this thesis. Therefore there is no way to detect data concealment as 
presented here except by using the given detection algorithm. We can take a brief 
overview of the query over multiple XML files using conventional approach and compare 
with our approach. Then we evaluate both approaches with dataset created with all listed 
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data hiding techniques and compare its efficiency in terms of performance. The detection 
techniques with logic are explained in detail in next sections.  
4.3 Detection Logic of Hidden Data 
The detection logic of hidden data is entirely dependent on the data hiding techniques and 
involves investigation of multiple XML files of OOXML document. The detection logic 
for each data hiding technique is different and needs to be explained first. We present our 
algorithm for hidden data detection and compare results with conventional algorithm and 
conclude the best approach. The basis of query to reveal concealed data from the 
document is also defined first for better understanding of the detection process. 
Detail overview of each detection query is explained in detection of hidden data section.  
The query involves first reading document’s relationship files and by using this 
information, it detects hidden data hides by the techniques listed. This proves that 
relationship information plays a vital role and becomes key information in detection 
process. As mentioned earlier there are two types of relationship files, package level and 
part level. Package level relationship file contains information such as “application used”, 
“machine information” and “starting point of the package” for the processing editor. 
Whereas the part level relationship file contains information of associated parts with main 
document along with their location. 
Furthermore, a document is combination of main document file, relationship files and 
their associated parts. Fig. 4.3 shows the main document file metadata code which 
includes associated parts and Fig. 4.4 shows part relationship file including entry of 
associated parts. The OOXML parser placed associated parts in the main document file 
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using relationship information and launched combined output of a document for user 










Fig. 4.3 – XML preview of Main document file                       Fig. 4.4 – XML preview of Part-  













 Fig. 4.5 – MS Word 2007 document output by merging main document file with associated parts. 
The inserted image is an image part of word document shown with text above. 
<w:document> 
  <w:body> 
    <w:p w:rsidR="00DC51FF" w:rsidRDefault="00401AD8"> 
       <w:r> 
          <w:t>Hello</w:t>  
       </w:r> 
    </w:p> 
    <w:p w:rsidR="0091776E" w:rsidRDefault="00401AD8"> 
       <w:r> 
          <w:drawing> 
 <wp:docPr id="1" name="Picture 0" descr="Dock.jpg" /> 
     <pic:nvPicPr> 
           <pic:cNvPr id="0" name="Dock.jpg" />  
     </pic:nvPicPr> 
                <pic:blipFill> 
    <a:blip r:embed="rId4" cstate="print" />  
  </pic:blipFill> 
 </wp:inline> 
           </w:drawing> 
        </w:r> 
     </w:p> 






   <Relationship Id="rId1"         
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/offic
eDocument/2006/relationships/styles"  
        Target="styles.xml"/> 
 
  <Relationship Id="rId2"         
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/offic
eDocument/2006/relationships/settings"  
        Target="settings.xml"/> 
 
   <Relationship Id="rId3"         
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/offic
eDocument/2006/relationships/webSettings"  
        Target="webSettings.xml"/> 
 
   <Relationship Id="rId4"         
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/offic
eDocument/2006/relationships/image"  





4.3.1 Detecting Hidden Data using OOXML Relationship Structure 
This technique requires detection logic to ensure that all package parts and relationships 
are verifiable against the OOXML standard. This also confirms that all parts must 
associate with their relevant counter parts or the main document file. Using this 
approach, the unverifiable and irrelevant parts are being separated by our algorithm and 
highlighted as hidden data for further investigation. 
We start our analysis with MS Word document and extract it for further analysis. Next, 
the extracted files are analyzed by detection algorithm and perform first check for 
unknown parts and unknown relationships. This requires detection query to scan both 
the relationship files, package level “.rels” and part level “document.xml.rels” and 
identifies relationship type which is not defined in the ECMA-376 standard. This 
undefined relationship “Type” is being separated along with its attributes such as “Id” 
and “Target”. The “Target” attribute identify the unknown part and its location as shown 







Fig. 4.6 – Unknown Relationship & Unknown Part 











By performing this check the query detect hidden parts, hides using unknown parts and 
unknown relationship technique. The detection logic of unknown parts and unknown 












Figure 4.7 – Detection Logic for Unknown Parts & 
                Unknown Relationships Technique 
 
4.3.2 Detecting Hidden Data using XML Format Feature & OOXML 
Relationship Structure 
 
This logic discovers the data hidden by using ignorable attribute. In the previous section 
we hid an image inside MS Office document using this technique. In order to detect the 
hidden image, the query first scans main document file “document.xml” for ignorable 
attribute and if found, separates all the metadata code inside ignorable attribute tag. We 
observed that in main document file “document.xml” contains “r:embed” attribute which 
carries same value of part relationship file “document.xml.rels” attribute “Id”. Next in 
this metadata code, the query looks for “r:embed” attribute value and matches it with 
part relationship file “Id” attribute value.  The matched relationship “Id” attribute 













explained earlier, the OOXML parser ignores processing of metadata tags within 
ignorable attribute. This is worth mentioning that hidden image inside the document 
seems to be normal as its corresponding metadata is also being present in main 
document file along with its relationship information in part relationship file.  
This technique considered hard to detect because it satisfies all the relationship 
requirements and unlikely to arouse anyone attention. The algorithm classifies ignorable 











Figure 4.8 – Detection Logic for Ignorable Attribute Technique 
4.3.3 Detecting Hidden Data Using OOXML Flexibility For Embedded   
Resource Architecture 
 
To detect data hidden by using customXML data technique we begins with performing 
check to validate all the files defined in .rels files in MS Office 2007 application. The 
package relationship file “.rels” and part relationship file “document.xml.rels” are used 
to validate and ensures that all the parts present inside the package are associated with 
























hidden data and are being detected by performing this check. The query double checks 
the parts to see if its relationship with the main document is exists and custom XML data 
generated by the word document is not being detected as hidden data. Detection logic of 












Figure 4.9 – Detection Logic for CustomXml Technique 
4.3.4 Detecting Hidden Data Using OOXML File Architecture 
Flexibility of Swapping Parts 
 
Fourth identified technique is using images of an OOXML document and proves 
unfeasible to detect using only time stamp information. Incase document is unzipped and 
the image file is being replaced by the mischievous user, the time stamp information is 
being lost and new time stamp is owed by the document when zipped again. For further 
analysis when document is unzips again the time stamp information of all the files are 
set to be current system date and time. Another file “/docprops/core.xml” presents inside 







insufficient to guess whether the changes has been made in the image file. This 
information is only limited to tracking of the documents as mentioned earlier.  
Based on this analysis the only way to ensure that image does not contains hidden data, 
currently available image stegonagraphic tools can be used for steganalysis. Detection 









Figure 4.10 – Detection Logic for Image Steganography Technique 
In next sub-section we will introduce our proposed hidden data detection algorithm. We 
discuss its efficient implementation and customization for MS Office 2007 documents. 
We choose XQuery to implement our proposed algorithm logic as it provides efficient 
implementation for XML based files. We compare result of approaches, a conventional 
detection algorithm and the proposed Office Open Multi-XML Query Algorithm 
(OOMXQA). After the discussion we present the results of our implemented algorithm 
with empirical evidence analysis which accurately predicts the performance measured 
and concludes with a future enhancement of our algorithm. Symbol Definitions used for 









The execution of XML queries over multiple XML files is implemented inefficiently by 
query over one by one and this problem puzzled us for ages. We adopted a Multi-XML 
querying algorithm named SMXQA (Semantic Based Multi-XML Query Algorithm) to 
solve the problem efficiently. The adopted SMXQA is generic in nature [28]. The basic 
idea is surprisingly simple, but incredibly powerful. We designed and customised this 
algorithm for OOXML document and named as Office Open Multi-XML Query 
Algorithm (OOMXQA). A basic OOXML document or MS Office 2007 document 
without an image contains at least 12 XML files. Fig. 4.11 & Fig. 4.12 show the files of 











  Fig. 4.11 – Office 2007 document – A document  
  is referred as a package by Microsoft and objects  
  insidea package are referred as parts. A package is  
  a zip archive which comprises of multiple XML  
  files and objects such as image or any other type format.   
     
                              Fig. 4.12 – MS Office document with   
                              main folders and files along with the data 
 
For integrity we only discussed the files used to reveal hidden data inside a MS Office 





from MS Office 2007 document are being used by our algorithm. These files contain the 
relationship files which include the package “_rels/.rels” and part level 













  Fig. 4.13 – Package level (/_rels/.rels) and  
  part level (/word/_rels/document.xml.rels) 
  relationship files are listed with their elements  
  and attributes. 
                                                                                     Fig 4.14 – Main document xml file snapshot 
 
 
4.4.1 OOMXQA Algorithm 
1: Create Document Type Definition (DTD) for both relationship files and main       
    document file of MS Office 2007 document. 
2: Identify Functional Dependency (FD) set over the DTD elements of main   
    document file and both relationship files. 
3: Create DTD for Global Materialized View (GMV) by specifying permissible  
    relationship type entry from OOXML standard. 







              set. 
5: Run OOMXQA on GMV to identify conceal data in MS Office 2007  
    document. 
 
4.4.2 OOMXQA Steps for OOXML Document Format 
Step 1 
The initiation of our algorithm begins with scanning of relationship files and main  
document file of MS Office 2007 document. 
Step 2 
Define DTD for relationship files and main document file which identifies the 
document structure with a list of legal elements and attributes for these files as 
seen in Fig. 4.15 & Fig. 4.16.  For simplicity, we consider DTD as schema 
definition language because of its simpler design over the XML schema (XSD) 
[25]. 
Step 3 
Based on the elements and attributes list the XML Functional Dependencies sets 
are identified over these DTD’s [29, 30, 31].  
We observe that both the relationship files are same in structure and hence their 
DTD elements and attributes are exactly the same, shown as Fig. 4.13. The 
functional dependency set for package and part relationship files are: 
FD1: package relationships (Id  Type, Target) 
FD2: part relationships (Id  Type, Target) 
As mentioned above, Fig. 4.13 shows package level and part relationship files structure. 
These files have “Relationship” element and “Id”, “Type” and “Target” as its attributes. 
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We call /Relationship the scope, Relationship/Id the determinant, and Relationship/Type 























Fig. 4.16 – DTD’s  of main document.xml file 
 
<!ELEMENT Relationships ( 
Relationship+ ) > 
<!ELEMENT Relationship EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST Relationship Id 
NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST Relationship Type 
CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST Relationship Target 
CDATA #REQUIRED > 
 
<!ELEMENT a:avLst EMPTY > 
 <!ELEMENT a:blip EMPTY > 
 <!ATTLIST a:blip cstate NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST a:blip r:embed NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ELEMENT a:ext EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST a:ext cx NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST a:ext cy NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT a:fillRect EMPTY >  
<!ELEMENT a:graphic ( a:graphicData ) >  
<!ELEMENT a:graphicData ( pic:pic ) >  
<!ATTLIST a:graphicData uri CDATA #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT a:graphicFrameLocks EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST a:graphicFrameLocks noChangeAspect NMTOKEN 
#REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT a:off EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST a:off x NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST a:off y NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT a:prstGeom ( a:avLst ) > 
 <!ATTLIST a:prstGeom prst NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ELEMENT a:stretch ( a:fillRect ) > 
 <!ELEMENT a:xfrm ( a:off, a:ext ) > 
<!ELEMENT pic:blipFill ( a:blip, a:stretch ) > 
<!ELEMENT pic:cNvPicPr EMPTY > 
<!ELEMENT pic:cNvPr EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST pic:cNvPr id NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST pic:cNvPr name CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<!ELEMENT pic:nvPicPr ( pic:cNvPr, pic:cNvPicPr ) >  
<!ELEMENT pic:pic ( pic:nvPicPr, pic:blipFill, pic:spPr ) >  
<!ELEMENT pic:spPr ( a:xfrm, a:prstGeom ) >  
<!ELEMENT w:body ( w:p+, w:sectPr ) > 
<!ELEMENT w:cols EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST w:cols w:space NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:docGrid EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:docGrid w:linePitch NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ELEMENT w:document ( w:body ) >  
<!ELEMENT w:drawing ( wp:inline ) >  
<!ELEMENT w:lang EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:lang w:eastAsia NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:noProof EMPTY > 
 <!ELEMENT w:p ( w:r ) > 
  
 
<!ATTLIST w:p w:rsidR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST w:p w:rsidRDefault NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:pgMar EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:bottom NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:footer NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:gutter NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:header NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:left NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:right NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:top NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:pgSz EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgSz w:h NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgSz w:w NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:r ( w:t, w:rPr?, w:drawing? ) >  
<!ELEMENT w:rPr ( w:noProof, w:lang ) >  
<!ELEMENT w:sectPr ( w:pgSz, w:pgMar, w:cols, w:docGrid ) >  
<!ATTLIST w:sectPr w:rsidR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:sectPr w:rsidSect NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ELEMENT w:t ( #PCDATA ) >  
<!ELEMENT wp:cNvGraphicFramePr ( a:graphicFrameLocks ) >  
<!ELEMENT wp:docPr EMPTY > 
 <!ATTLIST wp:docPr descr CDATA #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:docPr id NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:docPr name CDATA #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT wp:effectExtent EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent b NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent l NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent r NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent t NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT wp:extent EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST wp:extent cx NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST wp:extent cy NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT wp:inline ( wp:extent, wp:effectExtent, wp:docPr, 
wp:cNvGraphicFramePr, a:graphic ) >  
<!ATTLIST wp:inline distB NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:inline distL NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST wp:inline distR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  






In relationship there are several pairs of (Id, Type, Target) values. We note that 
we do not consider values (rId4, http://......././image, image1.jpeg) and (rId5, 
http://......././image, image2.jpeg) as a pair, as the two “Id” values in the pair are 
different. In the same way we also do not consider relationship attributes “Id”, 
“Type” and “Target” pairs from different locations as they are from two locations 
or files. To keep this relationship entry unique in Global Materialized View 
(GMV) as relationship Id values are repetitive among relationship files, we add 
“rels ” and “dxrels” tags to classify package level and part level relationship files 
using relationship file names so associating this tag with “Id” attribute the same 
“Id” values can be distinguished in a GMV. 
Like tabular approach, data inside the MS Office document files are stored in 
different XML sections. The parts are also stored separately inside a document 
and the relationship files used to carry information of main document parts. For 
main document file two types of functional dependency sets are needs to be 
defined: 
                     FD3:  (w:rsidR+w:rsidRDefault+r:embed  w:p ) for a document which   
                        contains an image. 
           FD4: (w:rsidR+w:rsidRDefault+w:t  w:p) for a document with only text. 
There is no homologous semantic that exists among functional dependency sets of 
main document DTD elements and relationship DTD elements. We observed that 
an element which carries identical value is “Id” attribute of part-relationship file 
and “r:embed” attribute of main document file for an image part. In another case 




This indicates that in each w:p, triplet (w:rsidR,w:rsidRDefault,r:embed) pair wise 
determines w:p. The main node is “w:document” and has “w:body” as the child 
node. This child node further contains pairs of w:p nodes which organizes the 
main document in sections. According to the specification, the “rsidR” values of 
w:p nodes should be unique within a document: instances with the same value 
within a single document indicate that modifications occurred during the same 
editing session [10]. We notice that these values are same for pairs of “w:p” 
elements.  
As mentioned earlier the FD attribute set identifies “w:p” element or a section of 
the main document file. The only linked attribute exists if a document contains a 
legitimate image that is “r:embed” and its value can be used to link main 
document with its relationship file. To identify hidden data of a document we 
need to scan this file completely with identical values from relationship files. If a 
document wouldn’t contain any legitimate image(s) then “rsidR” values can be 
repetitive and hard to identify “w:p” element.  
In FD1, the (Id) exclusively determines its type and target. In FD3 or FD4, 
(w:rsidR + w:rsidRDefault + r:embed / w:t) determines its “w:p” and associated 
attributes. From the DTDs information we created the GMV of these multiple xml 
files inside a document. The DTD of GMV is shown below as Fig. 4.17. 
 
Step 4 
We define DTD for Global Materialized View (GMV) over MS Office 2007 
document relationship and main document files by specifying permissible 









Fig. 4.18. GMV’s-DTD 







Fig. 4.17. GMV’s- DTD for an OOXML document with elements and attributes 
We use Global Materialized View DTD’s information to create GMV among files 
of Office 2007 document and validate their relationship types with Microsoft 
permissive relationship types as shown in GMV–DTD. The undefined 
relationship types which are not listed in OOXML standard are separated along 
with their target parts considered as unknown relationships and unknown parts. 
The rest of the hidden data using other data concealment approaches are also 
revealed using relationship information with main document file of MS Office 
2007 document.  
Step 5 
Finally, a Global Materialized View (GMV) is being created using FD’s 
information among relationship and main document files. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> 
<!-- <!DOCTYPE JointDTD -->  
<!ELEMENT JointDTD 
(Relationships|Relationship|Default|Override|Document|DocEmbed|Dx)*> 
<!ELEMENT Relationships ( Relationship+ ) >  
<!ATTLIST Relationships xmlns:Relationships CDATA #FIXED 
"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">  
<!ELEMENT Relationship (#PCDATA)> 
<!ATTLIST Relationship Id CDATA #REQUIRED> 






properties) #REQUIRED>  
<!ATTLIST Relationship Target CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST Relationship FileType CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT Default (#PCDATA)> 
<!ATTLIST Default Extension CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST Default ContentType CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT Override (#PCDATA)> 
<!ATTLIST Override PartName CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!-- ATTLIST Override ContentType CDATA #REQUIRED --> 
<!ELEMENT Document (DocEmbed)> 
<!ATTLIST Document xmlns:Dx CDATA #FIXED 
"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships" 











This information needs to detect hidden data and to create view among document 
and relationship files. As to make it simple for algorithm, the metadata of main 
document file is entirely merged with relationship files to create a Global 
Materialized View attached as Appendix C. 
The code for both the algorithm logics to detect hidden data is being presented 
next. The conventional detection algorithm reads document files one by one. The 
second approach works more efficiently with a GMV and can read multiple files 
as one. 
The designed query runs on XML files which are typically twig or small tree patterns. 
We use DTD information of XML files to tailored nodes and produce Minimum 
Connecting Trees (MCTs) for the query. This reduces decomposition-matching-merging 
process and enables query to fit targeted documents and is more efficient than 
conventional methods in query processing [32, 33, 34]. The XQuery code for OOMXQA 
technique is attached as Appendix D whereas, a conventional algorithm technique which 
read files one by one is attached as Appendix E. Moreover, code for creating GMV is 
also attached as Appendix F. We apply the proposed algorithm on created MS Word 2007 
document dataset contains hidden data of all the data hiding techniques presented in data 
hiding section of this thesis. 
The OOMXQA can be easily extended to other document formats such as Open 
Document Format (ODF) by customizing it according to relationship structure 
information of ODF standard. Report showing OOMXQA result which contains hidden 














Fig. 4.19 – XQuery Result – Hidden files inside MS Word 2007 document dataset 
 
In above results, the relationship Id’s “rId100” and “rId300” contains relationship types 
ends with “/a” and “/ignore” are unknown relationship types and the parts associated 
using target attribute are unknown parts. The “mask.jpeg” and “image3.jpeg” are hidden 
parts identified inside MS Word 2007 document dataset using unknown relationship type 
information. Another relationship Id “rId8” image part “ignore.jpeg” is concealed using 
ignorable attribute technique in the main document file. The hidden image is searched 
under main document metadata including ignorable metadata created for this image 
which seems to be a valid image for a document. The relationship Id “rId200” is the last 
hidden file in this MS Word 2007 document dataset, whereas its associated target file 
“test.xml” is hides using CustomXML technique. This CustomXML file is not associated 
with main document file whereas looks legitimate as created by MS Office 2007 
document. 
 
4.5 Performance Evaluation 
We performed the experiment on a dataset created with all presented data hiding 









< SubPkg -Relationship Id="rId300" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/ignor
e" Target="media/image3.jpeg"/> 








standard practice and their average result time has been presented. The comparison 
summary of both the approaches for hidden data detection functionality against each 
technique and the average elapsed time of the queries are as follows.  





Unknown Parts & Unknown Relationships YES YES 
Ignorable Attribute NO YES 
Custom XML Data NO YES 

















Conventional Algorithm OOMXQA Algorithm
Avg. Elapsed Time (ms)
Avg. Elapsed Time (ms)
69 
 
In summary, the above figure clearly shows that the approach of OOMXQA is 87% less 
time taken than the conventional one, which is one by one XML file querying approach. 
This is also very robust in terms of workloads because of the created GMV. This caters 
real time needs as thousands of MS Office documents transferred daily over the Internet. 
Therefore, our algorithm achieves the expectant effect. 
4.5.1 DataSets 
We create five OOXML documents with hidden data, four of them with each data hiding 
technique and one with all data hiding techniques listed in this thesis. We compare both 
detection approaches with a document contains hidden data using all the data hiding 
techniques. This OOXML document is of 6.6MB in size and contains 12 XML and 4 
image files in which 3 images and 1 XML files are hides inside a document. The 
conventional algorithm reads XML files one by one and takes an average of 4100ms to 
detect hidden data whereas proposed Office Open MultiXML Querying Algorithm 
(OOMXQA) only takes 520ms including query time for creating GMV. This proved that 
our approach is nearly 87% faster than the conventional approach as shown in Fig. 4.19. 
The machine used for performance test has 4GB of Ram and Intel Core 2 Duo P8400 
series processor using Windows Vista. The time results for queries are performed using 
stylus studio 2010. The dataset is freely available by emailing authors. 
4.6 Conclusion 
We implemented proposed OOMXQA using XQuery language because Office 2007 
documents follows OOXML standard. The designed XQuery runs on a created GMV and 
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reveal hidden data from the MS Office 2007 document. The GMV elements and 
attributes information is also presented as Fig’s. 4.17 and 4.18.                                                               
We used only XQuery native code so the code and logic can be easily implemented using 
any programming language or platform and open for further enhancement to other 
document formats plus for researchers in this area. This is a first step towards 
development of a single tool for law enforcement officers and facilitates forensic 
analysis. This also caters real world needs as thousands of office documents are 
transferred daily over the internet among different organizations and users. 
The Office 2007 application is considered to be the most widely used application.  As 
mentioned earlier, the proposed Office Open Multi-XML Querying algorithm requires 
only three files information of each MS Office 2007 document to detect all the hidden 
files inside a document using all data hiding techniques listed in this thesis. This is highly 
optimized and efficient detection algorithm and the result proves that its time efficiency 
is more than 87% superior than conventional single file to file reading algorithm. In order 
to validate the experiment results, we provide XQuery code for both the detection 
algorithm logics to detect hidden data with all listed techniques. The conventional 
detection algorithm reads document files one by one. The second approach works more 
efficiently with a GMV of multiple XML files and can be read as one. The comparison 




Conclusions & Future Work 
5.1 Conclusions 
Steganography is a fascinating and effective method of hiding data that has been used 
throughout history. There are methods that can be employed to uncover such devious 
tactics, but the first step is an awareness that such methods do exist. There are many good 
reasons to use steganography in OOXML documents, regardless of the fact that the 
technology is easy to use and difficult to detect. 
Microsoft Office suite is the most widely used for creating documents and proved to be 
the most at risk and so they would serve as a great target for this work. Recently 
Microsoft announced OOXML format for its MS Office 2007 suite. This thesis proposes 
the possibility of hiding data in OOXML documents by using the techniques listed in data 
hiding section, and one can see that there exists a large selection of approaches of hiding 
data with different strong and weak points respectively.  
For steganalysis, the use of forensic tools is very important in the digital investigation 
process. This requires a tool which must adapt technology of cover media being used for 
hiding data. For example, if a suspect hides something in the OOXML document, an 
investigator should have the appropriate tools embedding OOXML file format 
relationships technology to detect hidden data. 
In general, analysis of hidden data in OOXML document is divided into two phases. The 
first phase is to identify whether there is hidden data by searching for anomaly. For 
example, the analysis of hidden data in OOXML document zip archive, it is unlikely that 
72 
 
MS Office 2007 document inspector to detect. This is suspicious and requires further 
analysis. The second phase is to recover the hidden data files. Since hidden data is 
usually stored inside OOXML document – zip archive, with other parts or metadata, it is 
hard to recover them. Recovery is particularly challenging if suspects data satisfies the 
relationships order of an OOXML document. 
There is no specific forensic analysis tool that checks for hidden data in OOXML 
documents except tool based on given OOMXQA detection algorithm. While the analysis 
techniques discussed in this thesis are able to detect and recover the hidden data, it is time 
consuming without automated tools. 
The data hiding techniques that have been discussed in this thesis are just a fraction of 
possible ways to hide data. There are always new techniques to hide data and the art of 
data hiding highly depends on suspect’s creativity. One of the difficulties of analyzing 
OOXML document format is that it is flexible and can thus support many options. As a 
result, there are many possible ways to hide data. In addition, without published 
specifications, it is hard to guess which value combinations are valid and which are 
unknown. 
It is certain that the use of steganography will continue to increase and thus will be a 
growing hurdle for law enforcement and counterterrorism activities. Ignoring the 
significance of steganography because of the lack of statistics is "security through denial" 
and is not a good strategy.  Thus for an agent to decide on which steganographic 
algorithm to use, he would have to decide on the type of application he want to use the 





This thesis has investigated a novel approach to document steganography which provided 
enhancements to the current available steganographic techniques. The focus is on the 
shift from proprietary formats to XML based formats which has been adopted by MS 
Office 2007 known as OOXML for document representation. Earlier versions of MS 
Office documents used binary formats which is a compound document format. 
A comprehensive review of steganographic work in document steganography especially 
for OOXML documents was discussed and classified into five main categories. These 
includes data hiding using OOXML relationship structure, data hiding using XML format 
features, data hiding using XML format features and OOXML Relationship Structure, 
data hiding using OOXML flexibility for embedded resource architecture and data hiding 
using OOXML flexibility of swapping parts.  
It was observed that the current steganalysis algorithm rely heavily on the conventional 
searching techniques, whereas OOXML document comprises of several XML files and 
binary objects. The performance of conventional detection algorithm is relatively low as 
it reads these files one by one and fails to identify hidden data for all the techniques listed 
in this thesis. The proposed OOMXQA detection algorithm reads these files as one by 
creating global materialized view based on functional dependency sets identified and 
proves that it is 87% faster than conventional algorithm and also works for all the 
techniques listed. The results were promising and outperformed relevant methods. This 
caters real time needs as thousands of documents are transferred daily over the net. 
The OOMXQA algorithm is design and developed using XQuery code and enables to use 
with steganalysis tools used in the industry or by other researchers. This is also a first 
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step towards development of a single tool for law enforcement officers and further 
facilitation of forensic analysis. 
5.3 Future Research 
The ease of manipulation and transmission, communication means are shifting from 
paper documents to e-documents globally. Millions of documents are transferred globally 
over the net and until now, there is no system yet which can monitor the manipulation of 
documents and detect steganography in documents. Based on the work done in this 
thesis, the following recommendations are made for further work in this area: 
 The flexibility of OOXML document structure can motivate further possible 
techniques of data hiding in OOXML documents. 
 Analyzing OOXML document metadata, which could be useful for querying 
purposes such as: unique reference, date and time stamp, owner and machine 
name etc. This information facilitated unauthorized tampering performed by 
mischievous user without leaving any perceptible traces can stand up in a court as 
reliable evidence [10]. 
 Applying the identified data hiding techniques to similar word processing 
applications using XML format such as ODF documents and observe their 
behavior and propose modified set of rules based on their relationship structure to 
be used for data hiding and detection process. 
 The detection algorithm can be further enhances by adding the functionality of 
cryptanalysis with possible encoding/encryption methods supported by OOXML 
documents. Moreover, adding together of parallel searching feature for multiple 
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documents such as batch processing caters real world needs and permits 
steganalysis for hundreds of documents in no time. 
 To develop a single document steganalysis framework for forensic analysis by 
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Appendix A – Functional Dependency in XML Documents 
 
DTD & XML Document Tree: 
 
 
DTD D = (Ec, Es, A, M, N, r), where 
 Ec is the finite set of complex elements 
 Es is the finite set of simple elements 
 A is the finite set of attribute names 
 M is the map from Ec to element type:            is a regular expression 
                                     
 Where   denotes null string,                                     denote union, 
connection and Kleene closure; 
 N denotes the map from Ec to the attribute set, for      , any M(e) not   or 
N(e) not   
 r      is another different element name,        , r is the only flag in    
which is not in the alphabet of M(e). 
 
        XML Tree T = (V, M, ele, att, num, str, root), where 
 V is the node set of XML tree 
 M is the map from V to          , it can get the node type in V, if M(v) 
   , then a node v   V is called a complex element node else then it is called 
a simple element node. If M (v)     , then it is called attribute node. 
 ele and att are the functions defined on the set of complex elements: for every 
    , if M(v)     then ele(v) denotes a list of element nodes and att(v) 
denotes a set of different attribute names 
 num denotes the function of node number from every attribute or element  
 str denotes the function of string value from every attribute or element, if 
M(v)    , str(v) is null, and if M(v)       A, str(v) is the document 
contained root denotes the only root node. 
 Path Language: 
 
Path Expression on DTD D = (Ec, Es, A, M, N, r),  
a simple path is defined as l1/ l2/... ln, where li   Ec (i=1, ..., n-1) and ln      Es  
   is called as a sequence of path. l1     M(r), li   M(li-1 ) for i [2, n-1] and ln    M(ln-
1 )    N(li-1 ). 
Whereas a complex path is in the form of l1/ l2/... ln, where li     {//}  (i=1, ..., 
n-1) and ln      Es    . Symbol “//” represent the Kleene closure of the 





 XML Functional Dependency: 
 
XFD Constraint language on DTD D, functional dependency for XML (XFD) is φ 
over D has the form P: Q: X1, ..., Xn -> Y1, ..., Ym where 
 P   paths (D) is downward context path starting from the root, which 
identifies the scope of φ over D. If P ≠ r and P ≠ (where means empty path), 
then φ is called a local XFD, which means that the scope of φ is the sub-tree 
rooted at P and last (P)   El. Otherwise φ is called a global XFD, which means 
the scope of φ is the whole D or at the root and simplified as Q: X1, ... , Xn -> 
Y1, ..., Ym. 
 Q is called downward target path, where Q   paths(D) and P ϲ Q. 
 X1, ... , Xn is the left path of φ (Left Hand Side, LHS) and Y1, ... , Ym is the 
right path of (Right Hand Side, RHS), which is a non-empty subsets of paths 





















Appendix B – Document Type Definition (DTD) 
 
DTD of .rels & document.xml.rels 
 
<!ELEMENT Relationship EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST Relationship Id NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST Relationship Target CDATA #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST Relationship Type CDATA #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT Relationships ( Relationship+ ) > 
 
NOTE: Both relationship files are same in structure hence their DTD elements and 
attributes are same. We listed DTD of package level relationship file as sub-package level 
relationship file also be the same. 
 
DTD of document.xml 
 
<!ELEMENT a:avLst EMPTY > 
 
 <!ELEMENT a:blip EMPTY > 
 <!ATTLIST a:blip cstate NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST a:blip r:embed NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 
 
 <!ELEMENT a:ext EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST a:ext cx NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST a:ext cy NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:fillRect EMPTY >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:graphic ( a:graphicData ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:graphicData ( pic:pic ) >  
<!ATTLIST a:graphicData uri CDATA #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:graphicFrameLocks EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST a:graphicFrameLocks noChangeAspect NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:off EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST a:off x NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST a:off y NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT a:prstGeom ( a:avLst ) > 




 <!ELEMENT a:stretch ( a:fillRect ) > 
 
 <!ELEMENT a:xfrm ( a:off, a:ext ) > 
<!ELEMENT pic:blipFill ( a:blip, a:stretch ) > 
 
<!ELEMENT pic:cNvPicPr EMPTY > 
 
<!ELEMENT pic:cNvPr EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST pic:cNvPr id NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST pic:cNvPr name CDATA #REQUIRED > 
 
<!ELEMENT pic:nvPicPr ( pic:cNvPr, pic:cNvPicPr ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT pic:pic ( pic:nvPicPr, pic:blipFill, pic:spPr ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT pic:spPr ( a:xfrm, a:prstGeom ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:body ( w:p+, w:sectPr ) > 
 
<!ELEMENT w:cols EMPTY > 
<!ATTLIST w:cols w:space NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:docGrid EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:docGrid w:linePitch NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 
 <!ELEMENT w:document ( w:body ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:drawing ( wp:inline ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:lang EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:lang w:eastAsia NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:noProof EMPTY > 
 
 <!ELEMENT w:p ( w:r ) > 
 <!ATTLIST w:p w:rsidR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST w:p w:rsidRDefault NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:pgMar EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:bottom NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:footer NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:gutter NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:header NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:left NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgMar w:right NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  




<!ELEMENT w:pgSz EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgSz w:h NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:pgSz w:w NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ELEMENT w:r ( w:t, w:rPr?, w:drawing? ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:rPr ( w:noProof, w:lang ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT w:sectPr ( w:pgSz, w:pgMar, w:cols, w:docGrid ) >  
<!ATTLIST w:sectPr w:rsidR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST w:sectPr w:rsidSect NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ELEMENT w:t ( #PCDATA ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT wp:cNvGraphicFramePr ( a:graphicFrameLocks ) >  
 
<!ELEMENT wp:docPr EMPTY > 
 <!ATTLIST wp:docPr descr CDATA #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:docPr id NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:docPr name CDATA #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT wp:effectExtent EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent b NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent l NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent r NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:effectExtent t NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT wp:extent EMPTY >  
<!ATTLIST wp:extent cx NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST wp:extent cy NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
 
<!ELEMENT wp:inline ( wp:extent, wp:effectExtent, wp:docPr, 
wp:cNvGraphicFramePr, a:graphic ) >  
<!ATTLIST wp:inline distB NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  
<!ATTLIST wp:inline distL NMTOKEN #REQUIRED > 
 <!ATTLIST wp:inline distR NMTOKEN #REQUIRED >  




















  <Relationship Id="rId3" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/ex
tended-properties" Target="docProps/app.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId2" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships/metadata
/core-properties" Target="docProps/core.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/off
iceDocument" Target="word/document.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId100" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/Relationships/a" 




  <Relationship Id="rId3" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/we
bSettings" Target="webSettings.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId7" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/th
eme" Target="theme/theme1.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId2" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/set
tings" Target="settings.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId1" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/sty
les" Target="styles.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId6" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/fo
ntTable" Target="fontTable.xml" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId5" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/im
age" Target="media/image2.jpeg" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId4" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/im
age" Target="media/image1.jpeg" />  
 
  <Relationship Id="rId8" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/im




  <Relationship Id="rId300" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/raf
fay" Target="media/image3.jpeg" />  
  <Relationship Id="200" 
Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/cu
















- <w:p w:rsidR="00DC51FF" w:rsidRDefault="00401AD8"> 
- <w:r> 
  <w:t>Hello</w:t>  
  </w:r> 
  </w:p> 
- <w:p w:rsidR="0091776E" w:rsidRDefault="00401AD8"> 
- <w:r> 
- <w:rPr> 
  <w:noProof />  
  </w:rPr> 
- <w:drawing> 
- <wp:inline distT="0" distB="0" distL="0" distR="0"> 
  <wp:extent cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  <wp:effectExtent l="19050" t="0" r="0" b="0" />  
  <wp:docPr id="1" name="Picture 0" descr="Dock.jpg" />  
- <wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
  <a:graphicFrameLocks 
xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main" 
noChangeAspect="1" />  
  </wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
- <a:graphic xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main"> 
- <a:graphicData uri="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:pic xmlns:pic="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:nvPicPr> 
  <pic:cNvPr id="0" name="Dock.jpg" />  
  <pic:cNvPicPr />  
  </pic:nvPicPr> 
- <pic:blipFill> 
  <a:blip r:embed="rId4" cstate="print" />  
- <a:stretch> 
  <a:fillRect />  
  </a:stretch> 





  <a:off x="0" y="0" />  
  <a:ext cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  </a:xfrm> 
- <a:prstGeom prst="rect"> 
  <a:avLst />  
  </a:prstGeom> 
  </pic:spPr> 
  </pic:pic> 
  </a:graphicData> 
  </a:graphic> 
  </wp:inline> 
  </w:drawing> 
  </w:r> 
  </w:p> 




  <w:tab w:val="left" w:pos="1155" />  
  </w:tabs> 
  </w:pPr> 
- <w:r> 
- <w:rPr> 
  <w:noProof />  
  </w:rPr> 
  <w:lastRenderedPageBreak />  
- <w:drawing> 
- <wp:inline distT="0" distB="0" distL="0" distR="0"> 
  <wp:extent cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  <wp:effectExtent l="19050" t="0" r="0" b="0" />  
  <wp:docPr id="2" name="Picture 1" descr="Garden.jpg" />  
- <wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
  <a:graphicFrameLocks 
xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main" 
noChangeAspect="1" />  
  </wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
- <a:graphic xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main"> 
- <a:graphicData uri="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:pic xmlns:pic="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:nvPicPr> 
  <pic:cNvPr id="0" name="Garden.jpg" />  
  <pic:cNvPicPr />  
  </pic:nvPicPr> 
- <pic:blipFill> 
  <a:blip r:embed="rId5" cstate="print" />  
- <a:stretch> 
  <a:fillRect />  
  </a:stretch> 
  </pic:blipFill> 
- <pic:spPr> 
- <a:xfrm> 
  <a:off x="0" y="0" />  
  <a:ext cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  </a:xfrm> 
- <a:prstGeom prst="rect"> 
87 
 
  <a:avLst />  
  </a:prstGeom> 
  </pic:spPr> 
  </pic:pic> 
  </a:graphicData> 
  </a:graphic> 
  </wp:inline> 
  </w:drawing> 
  </w:r> 
  </w:p> 
- <w:sectPr w:rsidR="00401AD8" w:rsidRPr="0091776E" w:rsidSect="00DC51FF"> 
  <w:pgSz w:w="12240" w:h="15840" />  
  <w:pgMar w:top="1440" w:right="1440" w:bottom="1440" w:left="1440" w:header="720" 
w:footer="720" w:gutter="0" />  
  <w:cols w:space="720" />  
  <w:docGrid w:linePitch="360" />  
  </w:sectPr> 
- <a:IgnoreMe> 




  <w:tab w:val="left" w:pos="1155" />  
  </w:tabs> 
  </w:pPr> 
- <w:r> 
- <w:rPr> 
  <w:noProof />  
  </w:rPr> 
  <w:lastRenderedPageBreak />  
- <w:drawing> 
- <wp:inline distT="0" distB="0" distL="0" distR="0"> 
  <wp:extent cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  <wp:effectExtent l="19050" t="0" r="0" b="0" />  
  <wp:docPr id="2" name="Picture 1" descr="Garden.jpg" />  
- <wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
  <a:graphicFrameLocks 
xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main" 
noChangeAspect="1" />  
  </wp:cNvGraphicFramePr> 
- <a:graphic xmlns:a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main"> 
- <a:graphicData uri="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:pic xmlns:pic="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/picture"> 
- <pic:nvPicPr> 
  <pic:cNvPr id="0" name="Raffay.jpeg" />  
  <pic:cNvPicPr />  
  </pic:nvPicPr> 
- <pic:blipFill> 
  <a:blip r:embed="rId8" cstate="print" />  
- <a:stretch> 
  <a:fillRect />  
  </a:stretch> 





  <a:off x="0" y="0" />  
  <a:ext cx="5943600" cy="4457700" />  
  </a:xfrm> 
- <a:prstGeom prst="rect"> 
  <a:avLst />  
  </a:prstGeom> 
  </pic:spPr> 
  </pic:pic> 
  </a:graphicData> 
  </a:graphic> 
  </wp:inline> 
  </w:drawing> 
  </w:r> 
  </w:p> 
  </a:IgnoreMe> 



























xquery version "1.0"; 
declare default element namespace 
"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace ve="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006"; 
declare namespace o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"; 
declare namespace 
r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace m="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math"; 
declare namespace v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"; 
declare namespace 
wp="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing"; 
declare namespace w10="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word"; 
declare namespace w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main"; 
declare namespace wne="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml"; 
declare namespace a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/MyExtension/p1"; 
 
for $rels in doc("c:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/RnDxr.xml") //GlobalView/rels/Relationship 
where not(ends-with($rels/@Type, "extended-properties") or ends-with($rels/@Type, "core-
properties") or ends-with($rels/@Type, "officeDocument") ) 
return <Pkg-Relationships> {$rels/@Id} {$rels/@Type} {$rels/@Target}  
{for $dx in doc("c:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/RnDxr.xml") //GlobalView/docxml/w:body 
for $drels in doc("c:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/RnDxr.xml") //GlobalView/dxrels//Relationship 
where  
(ends-with($drels/@Type, "customXmlData") and matches($dx//body, string($drels/@Id) )) 
or  
not(ends-with($drels/@Type, "signature") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "origin") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "customXml") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "customXmlProps") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "thumbnail") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "aFChunk") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "comments") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "settings") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "endnotes") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "fontTable") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "footer") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "footnotes") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "glossaryDocument") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "header") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "numbering") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "styles") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "webSettings") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "attachedTemplate") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "frame") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "subDocument") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "mailMergeSource") or ends-with($drels/@Type, 
"mailMergeHeaderSource") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "transform") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "image") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "theme") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "font") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "hyperlink") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "vmlDrawing") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "printerSettings") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "custom-properties")) or ($dx//a:IgnoreMe//@r:embed=$drels/@Id) 





























NOTE: For Altova XML Spy 2010 to read from the zip archive, given code has to be 
amended as follows: doc("C:/All_Tech.zip|zip/_rels/.rels") 
xquery version "1.0"; 
declare default element namespace "http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace ve="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006"; 
declare namespace o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"; 
declare namespace r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace m="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math"; 
declare namespace v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"; 
declare namespace 
wp="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing"; 
declare namespace w10="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word"; 
declare namespace w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main"; 
declare namespace wne="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml"; 
declare namespace a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/MyExtension/p1"; 
 
for $rels in doc('jar:file:///C:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/All_Tech.zip!/_rels/.rels') 
//Relationships/Relationship 
where not(ends-with($rels/@Type, "extended-properties") or ends-with($rels/@Type, "core-
properties") or ends-with($rels/@Type, "officeDocument") ) 
return <Pkg-Relationships> {$rels/@Id} {$rels/@Type} {$rels/@Target}  
{for $dx in doc('jar:file:///C:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/All_Tech.zip!/word/document.xml') 
//w:document/w:body 
for $drels in doc('jar:file:///c:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/All_Tech.zip!/word/_rels/document.xml.rels') 
//Relationships/Relationship 
where  
(ends-with($drels/@Type, "customXmlData") and matches($dx//body, string($drels/@Id) )) or  
not(ends-with($drels/@Type, "signature") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "origin") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "customXml") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "customXmlProps") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "thumbnail") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "aFChunk") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "comments") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "settings") or ends-with($drels/@Type, 
"endnotes") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "fontTable") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "footer") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "footnotes") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "glossaryDocument") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "header") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "numbering") or ends-with($drels/@Type, 
"styles") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "webSettings") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "attachedTemplate") 
or ends-with($drels/@Type, "frame") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "subDocument") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "mailMergeSource") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "mailMergeHeaderSource") or 
ends-with($drels/@Type, "transform") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "image") or ends-
with($drels/@Type, "theme") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "font") or ends-with($drels/@Type, 
"hyperlink") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "vmlDrawing") or ends-with($drels/@Type, 
"printerSettings") or ends-with($drels/@Type, "custom-properties")) or 
($dx//a:IgnoreMe//@r:embed=$drels/@Id) 























xquery version "1.0"; 
declare default element namespace 
"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace ve="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006"; 
declare namespace o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"; 
declare namespace 
r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"; 
declare namespace m="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math"; 
declare namespace v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml"; 
declare namespace 
wp="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing"; 
declare namespace w10="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word"; 
declare namespace w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main"; 
declare namespace wne="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml"; 
declare namespace a="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/MyExtension/p1"; 
let $rels := doc('jar:file:///C:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/All_Tech.zip!/_rels/.rels') 
//Relationships/Relationship 
return <GlobalView><rels> {$rels}</rels> 




{let $doc := doc('jar:file:///C:/Users/Raffay/Desktop/All_Tech.zip!/word/document.xml') 
//w:document/w:body 
return <docxml>{$doc} 
</docxml>} 
</GlobalView> 
